Offensive Security

Red Team Exercise

A PSC red team exercise is an objective-driven adversary emulation that tests whether preventive, detective, and response controls work together against a credible attack path. It can combine external exposure, identity, endpoint, cloud, social, or physical vectors only where they are explicitly authorized.

The engagement is for organizations with established controls and a clear crown-jewel objective that want to measure operational resilience rather than collect isolated vulnerabilities. The outcome is an end-to-end attack narrative, ATT&CK-mapped observations, and a prioritized purple-team improvement plan.

Subject-matter owner: Viral Maniar · Managing Director and Principal ConsultantReviewer: Mike Chen · Lead Penetration Tester
Risk focus

Problems this engagement addresses

The scope follows credible attack and failure paths rather than a generic control checklist.

  • Controls assessed independently without evidence that they interrupt a complete attack path.
  • Detection coverage that exists as rules but has not been exercised against realistic techniques.
  • Identity, endpoint, network, cloud, and human signals that are not correlated during an incident.
  • Response playbooks that have not been tested under ambiguity and time pressure.
  • Leadership uncertainty about whether an adversary can reach a defined critical objective.
Engagement fit

When this service is useful

A clear fit decision protects assessment quality and prevents a broad request from becoming a shallow exercise.

Designed for

  • Organizations with a functioning security program, telemetry, and incident-response ownership.
  • A board, risk, or control question that can be expressed as a concrete adversary objective.
  • Teams prepared to coordinate a small trusted planning group and protect exercise confidentiality.
  • Defenders who can join a purple-team replay and implement detection improvements.

Not the right fit for

  • A first security assessment where basic asset inventory or vulnerability management is absent.
  • A broad request to attack anything without agreed objectives and rules of engagement.
  • A covert exercise that would create unmanaged safety, legal, privacy, or employment risk.
Scope

Choose the boundary that matches the decision

Options can be combined after owners, environments, authority, safety limits, and expected evidence are agreed.

External-to-objective

Begin from public exposure and test a controlled path through initial access, identity, privilege, movement, and the agreed objective.

Assumed breach

Start from an agreed foothold to focus time on identity, endpoint, cloud, lateral movement, detection, and response depth.

Threat-led emulation

Replay a relevant adversary's documented ATT&CK techniques against the controls intended to detect and contain them.

Prerequisites

  • A named executive sponsor, exercise controller, legal authority, and emergency stop process.
  • Defined objectives, crown-jewel systems, permitted techniques, and safety constraints.
  • A protected communication channel and agreed handling for sensitive exercise evidence.
  • Identified defenders and owners for the post-exercise replay and remediation plan.

Explicit exclusions

  • Destructive actions, uncontrolled persistence, data publication, or irreversible business impact.
  • Targets, people, suppliers, or facilities outside written authorization.
  • Employee performance assessment or deceptive activity outside approved governance.
  • Claims of complete adversary coverage from a time-bounded scenario.
Methodology

Evidence at every phase

Each phase produces an observable input to the final risk and remediation decisions.

  1. Objective and governance design

    Set the business objective, threat assumptions, rules, safety limits, communications, evidence handling, and stop conditions.

  2. Reconnaissance and scenario preparation

    Develop target intelligence and select realistic paths while preserving operational security and legal boundaries.

  3. Controlled adversary emulation

    Execute approved techniques across the relevant surfaces, adapting to controls while preventing unmanaged impact.

  4. Detection and response observation

    Record which signals were generated, correlated, investigated, contained, or missed without coaching defenders during a covert phase.

  5. Purple-team replay

    Reconstruct the operation with defenders, map ATT&CK coverage, validate improvements, and assign a measurable remediation backlog.

Standards and frameworks used

MITRE ATT&CKPTESCyber Kill ChainTIBER-EU conceptsCBEST concepts
Outputs

Deliverables built for decisions and fixes

Reporting separates observed evidence, uncertainty, business priority, and the action needed to verify remediation.

  • Objective-focused attack narrative and evidence timeline.
  • ATT&CK-mapped technique and control observations.
  • Detection, investigation, containment, and coordination gap analysis.
  • Executive risk briefing and technical purple-team replay.
  • Prioritized improvement backlog with validation opportunities.

Severity approach

Observations are prioritized by progress toward the agreed objective, access and privilege gained, detectability, containment opportunity, blast radius, and demonstrated control failure. The exercise distinguishes exploited weaknesses from missed telemetry and process delays.

Readout

A restricted executive readout explains the objective, path, business implication, and major control decisions. A separate technical replay gives defenders timestamps, techniques, evidence, and tuning opportunities without publishing unnecessary sensitive tradecraft.

Remediation support

PSC works with control owners to translate exercise observations into detection, hardening, identity, segmentation, and response improvements. Each action identifies an owner and a way to verify the control rather than relying on policy language alone.

Retest policy

Validation normally uses a focused purple-team replay of selected techniques and control points. A second covert exercise is a separate engagement because knowledge of the original scenario changes the test conditions.

Typical process

A governed path from scope to verification

Timing depends on scope, access, environment, and evidence quality; PSC confirms milestones during scoping rather than publishing unsupported duration promises.

01

Set the objective and controller group

02

Build a governed scenario

03

Emulate the approved attack path

04

Measure detection and response

05

Replay and validate improvements

FAQ

Questions buyers ask before scoping

Final rules, access, and deliverables are confirmed in the engagement scope.

How is a red team different from penetration testing?

Penetration testing finds and validates weaknesses in a defined target. A red team starts with an operational objective and tests how people, process, and technology prevent, detect, investigate, and contain an end-to-end attack path.

Will our security team know about the exercise?

A small controller group always knows. Whether defenders are informed depends on the objective and governance decision. Covert phases still require legal authority, emergency contacts, and agreed safety controls.

Can social engineering or physical access be included?

Yes, but only as explicitly scoped modules with approved targets, pretexts, handling rules, and stop conditions. They are not assumed parts of every exercise.

What makes the exercise useful after the final report?

The purple-team replay connects each technique to available telemetry and response decisions, then turns the evidence into owned improvements that can be validated with focused replays.

Scope this service

Discuss red team exercise with PSC.

Share the system, decision, and constraints. PSC will confirm whether this service fits before proposing a scope.

Request a scoped assessment